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Abstract
Post-inflationary boundary conditions are essential to the existence of
our highly structured universe, and these can only come about through
quantum mechanical state reductions – i.e., through measurements. The
choice is between: An ‘objective’ measurement that allows reduction to
occur independent of conscious observers, and an ‘observer’ based mea-
surement that ties reduction to the existence of a conscious observer. It
is shown in this paper that that choice cannot be determined empirically;
so how we finally understand state reduction will be decided by the way
that reduction is used in a wider (future) theoretical framework.
Introduction
In four previous papers[1, 2, 3, 4], five rules of engagement are given that describe
how conscious observers engage quantum mechanical systems. These rules do
not include the Born rule (i.e., the Born interpretation) that is replaced in this
treatment by a rule that introduces probability through probability current only.
A summary of these rules and a more general discussion about them appears in
another paper[5].
The 1st rule describes a stochastic trigger that selects an eigenvalue of some
variable on the basis of probability current. The 2nd rule is a selection rule
that provides for the creation of ‘ready’ brain states. These are brain states
that are not initially conscious, but will become conscious the moment they
are stochastically chosen. The 3rd rule says that when a ready brain state is
stochastically chosen it will become conscious, and that all the other components
will go to zero. The 4th rule is another selection rule that forbids a transition
from a ready brain state to another ready brain state of the same observer.
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There is also a 5th rule that has no bearing on the problem discussed in this
paper.
These rules provide for the collapse of a wave function in the presence of an
observer. This collapse is specifically brought about by rule (3).
Rule (3): If a component that is entangled with a ready brain state B is
stochastically chosen, then B will become conscious, and all other components
will be immediately reduced to zero.
Such luminaries as Von Neumann, Wigner, London, and Bauer have cham-
pioned the idea that stochastic choice in quantum mechanics depends on the
presence of a conscious or potentially conscious observer as expressed by rule (3).
However, there is wide opinion among physicists that measurement (i.e., a
stochastic choice) should take place independent of the presence of a conscious
observer. It is easy to write a rule that would provide for such an ‘objective’
reduction. I call it rule (1a).
Rule (1a): If a component of a superposition is locally incoherent with other
components in the superposition, and if it is stochastically chosen, then all those
other components will be immediately reduced to zero.
If the environmental decoherence affecting any subsystem is sufficient to
make one of its components locally incoherent with other components, then
according to rule (1a), a stochastic choice of that component will reduce all
those other components to zero. A ‘state reduction’ of this kind will be called
an objective measurement because an observer need not be present for it to
occur.
This rule is not itself a theory. None of the rules referred to above constitute
a theory. They are only ad hoc claims about nature that potentially reflect the
requirements of a wider, but still unknown, theoretical framework. Rule (1a)
for instance, might be validated by a spontaneous reduction theory like that of
Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [6], or a gravitational theory like that of Penrose
[7]. However, when considering rule (1a), I do not assume that one of these
theories is correct; and in fact, I am not inclined to believe either one of them.
That does not prevent me from assuming that rule (1a) is correct on the basis
of some as yet unknown theory, nor does it prevent me from assuming that the
other rules of engagement are correct in the same way. In this paper, as in
the previous papers, I work only at the level of the rules themselves, without
worrying about how they might be theoretically explained or justified. My goal
is to get the right results (judged empirically) without regard to a rationale
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that might explain them. I do this by ‘grounding’ the solutions of Schro¨dinger’s
equation as completely as possible in observation.
Rules (1-4) are still Necessary
Even if rule (1a) is adopted, we will still need rules (1-4). Rule (1) will be
required in any case in order to provide for the existence of a stochastic trigger;
and when there is an observer in the picture, rule (2) will be required to insure
the existence of ready brain states that perform the role described for them in
refs. 1-5. Rule (3) should be modified in this case, for although it is necessary to
insure that ready brain states become conscious when stochastically chosen, it
would be redundant for rule (3) to also require a collapse of the wave function.
So the adoption of rule (1a) should be coupled with a modification of rule (3)
called rule (3mod), where the latter provides only for the conversion of a ready
brain state to a conscious brain state upon stochastic choice. Rule (4) will
also be necessary in an objective measurement scenario in order to prevent the
appearance of the anomalous results described in refs. 1, 2, and 5.
An example of the effect of rule (1a) would be the reduction of the parti-
cle/detector system in eq. 1 in refs. 1 or 5. Prior to a stochastic hit at time tsc
we would have
Φ(tsc > t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0 +D1(t) (1)
where the second component is zero at t0 and increases in time. The Schro¨dinger
process provides the required probability current flow from the first component
to the second component; and the two components will be incoherent almost as
soon as the second one is formed. This insures an eventual stochastic hit on the
second component according to rule (1), because that rule associates positive
current flow with the probability per unit time of a stochastic hit. Since there is
no observer in this picture, rules (1) and (1a) will be entirely sufficient to affect
a state reduction in this objective measurement, yielding
Φ(t ≥ tsc > t0) = D1
Any non-identity reduction is a boundary reduction because it creates a new
boundary for Schro¨dinger’s equation. See ref. 5 for a discussion of the impor-
tance of new boundaries in a post-inflationary universe.
Let an observer subsequently interact with D1. Following a stochastic hit at
time tsc(ob) that occurs during the ensuing physiological interaction, rules (1),
(1a), (2), and mod (3) will give rise to
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Φ(t ≥ tsc(ob) > tsc > t0) = D1B1 (2)
where the underline means that the brain state B1 is conscious.
Now consider what will happen if rule (1a) is not in play and rule (3) as
originally stated is the sole source of state reduction. Then the detector in
eq. 1 cannot by itself undergo state reduction, for an observer is not present.
However, if a conscious observer is initially entangled with the detector, then
the interaction will take the form given by eq. 2 in refs. 1 and 5.
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (3)
where the second component is zero at t0 and increases in time. The under-
lined brain state B0 is conscious, and the not-underlined brain state B1 is a
ready brain state. Rule (2) is necessary at this point to insure that the second
component contains a ready brain state and not a conscious state. Rule (2) is
a selection rule that prevents the brain’s Hamiltonian from directly creating a
discrete conscious state in this or in any interaction.
Here again the current flow into the second component will cause a stochastic
hit at some time tsc. However, in this case the resulting state reduction will be
due to rule (3) as originally stated, for rule (1a) is not in play. This is also a
boundary reduction that is brought about by an observer measurement yielding
Φ(t ≥ tsc > t0) = D1B1 (4)
which is empirically indistinguishable from the objective measurement leading
to eq. 2.
Therefore, the observer cannot know if rule (1a) or rule (3) is correct. On
purely empirical grounds we should therefore abandon rule (1a) citing Occam’s
razor. That’s because wemust provide for a state reduction in the presence of an
observer, but it isn’t empirically necessary to provide for a reduction otherwise.
However, this matter will not be decided on empirical grounds. In the end,
the choice will be made on the basis of the theoretical arguments that can be
assembled on behalf of either kind of reduction.
A Terminal Observer
A terminal observer is one who looks at the detector at a time tob after the
time tf when the particle/detector interaction has run its course. This gives
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rise to a physiological interaction that alters eq. 1 as shown in eq. 5 of ref. 1,
giving
Φ(t ≥ tob > tf ) = ψ(t)D0X +D1(tf )X (5)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0 +D
′
1(tf )B1
where X is the unknown brain state of the observer who does not initially
interact with the detector. Current flows from the first row to the second row
in eq. 5, where the components in the second row are equal to zero prior to
tob. Since ready brain states are included in the only components that receive
probability current, the stochastic choice that is made in this case will be the
same for an observer measurement as for an objective measurement. So again,
the observer cannot tell if rule (1a) is or is not in effect. The choice is empirically
indeterminate.
Alternatives Empirically Unverifiable
The above examples set the pattern. In the appendix of this paper I go through
all of the remaining cases studied in refs. 1-2, and in all these cases the result is
the same. The observer cannot tell if rule (1a) is or is not the correct reduction
rule. I conclude that it is impossible to empirically discriminate between an ob-
server measurement scenario and an objective measurement scenario. To quote
a footnote in ref. 5,
“If an earlier boundary condition is uniquely correlated with a later
observation, and if the observation is stochastically chosen by the
rules (1-3) proposed above, then it will be impossible for the ob-
server to know if the earlier boundary was also chosen by an earlier
application of rule (1a). This will be true even if the boundary is not
uniquely correlated with the observation. Causal correlations that
connect back to a range of possible earlier ‘incoherent’ boundaries
will result in uncertainty in the boundary conditions that led to the
observation. So the precise nature of the earlier boundary cannot be
verified by the observer, and there will be no reason for him to believe
that any one of those possible boundaries was (or was not) the only
boundary by virtue of an earlier rule (1a) reduction. Therefore, to
this extent, the effects of rule (1a) are empirically indistinguishable
from the effects of rule (3). An exception may seem to be possible
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if causal connections go back to a range of earlier ‘coherent’ bound-
aries; however, an example like this is worked out . . . with results
that also support indistinguishability.”
This example is in the next section.
Nondemolition of Coherent Boundaries
The discussion so far has assumed that the initial system is either a single state
or an incoherent superposition or mixture of states. But the question is: What
will happen if the system is initially a ‘coherent’ superposition? If the result of
a rule (3) observation depends on the properties of the superposition, then a
rule (1a) reduction that occurs prior to that observation might produce different
results. In that case, the observer would be able to tell if rule (1a) is or is not
in effect. An example is the nondemolition measurement of a pair of 1/2 spin
particles in a zero spin state. It should be possible to measure the total spin
of this pair along any axis without measuring or interfering with their total
spin along another axis, thus preserving the superposition. However, a rule (1a)
reduction might occur when one of the two participating detectors makes contact
with one of the particles, and that would destroy the superposition. It is shown
below that that does not happen.
Let Φ1 be the zero spin state (J
2 = 0) = (2)−1/2(↑↓ − ↓↑), plus a pair
of detectors. The detectors are represented by a single symbol D with two
subscripts – the first for the variable that interacts with the first particle, and the
second for the variable that interacts with the second particle. Either variable
prior to the particle interaction is given by a subscript 0.
ΦI(initially) = (2)
−1/2(↑↓ − ↓↑)D00 (6)
The two detectors are brought together at event O in fig. 1 so that their
internal variables can be jointly prepared in a (prescribed) way that leaves
them entangled throughout the experiment. The reason for this preparation
will be explained below. The detectors separate after event O, allowing the first
detector to interact with the first particle at event A (in fig. 1). This interaction
occurs for a brief time between t1 and t1 + ǫ, giving
Φ(t1 + ǫ > t > t1) = c1(t){(↑↓)D00 − (↓↑)D00} (7)
+ c2(t){(↑ D10) ↓ −(↓ D10) ↑}
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where the second row in eq. 7 is zero at time t1 and increases until time t1 + ǫ
when the first row goes to zero. The subscript 1 in D10 means that the first
detector has interacted with the first particle. When this interaction is complete,
the state is
ΦII(t2 > t > t1 + ǫ) = (2)
−1/2{(↑ D10) ↓ −(↓ D10) ↑} (8)
I do not indicate a difference between the subscript 1 that appears in the first
component of eq. 8 and the subscript 1 that appears in the second component. It
is true that these subscripts represent interactions with different spin directions
of the first particle; but the detector’s internal variable is chosen in such as way
that the interaction causes it to become every bit as indefinite as the spin that it
engages. As a result, each D10 in eq. 8 is indefinite, so there is no possibility of
distinguishing between the two states apart from the spin vector to which each
is correlated. Therefore, the first detector cannot separately “measure” spin up
or spin down of the first particle in this interaction; and since both detector
states are indefinite, the entire function ΦII is indefinite[8].
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Figure 1
Following event A, the second detector interacts with the second particle at
event B between times t2 and t2 + ǫ, giving
Φ(t2 + ǫ > t > t2) = c3(t){(↑ D10) ↓ −(↓ D10) ↑} (9)
+ c4(t){↑ D11 ↓ − ↓ D11 ↑}
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where the second row is zero at time t2 and increases until time t2+ ǫ when the
first row goes to zero. The final state of the system is therefore
ΦIII = (2)
−1/2{↑ D11 ↓ − ↓ D11 ↑}
which is the same as (J2 = 0) correlated with the final state of the detector
pair.
ΦIII = (2)
−1/2{(↑↓ − ↓↑}D11 (10)
Although the detector state in eq. 8 is indefinite, the interaction at event B
restores the detectors to a definite state D11. This restoration is possible be-
cause of the initial joint preparation of the detector variables at the time of
event O. That preparation correlates the internal variables in such a way that
the indefinite variable associated with the first detector (after event A) will add
to the indefinite variable associated with the second detector (after event B),
to yield a definite variable associated with D11. See ref. 8. In this sequence, the
detector pair has therefore made a definite nondemolition measurement of the
particle pair, finding them in the coherent superposition (2)−1/2(↑↓ − ↓↑) in
which they began. Figure 1 shows the two detectors being physically reunited
at event P so that their variables can be joined to give a definite result.
Now consider how state reduction might affect these results.
Let rule (3) be in play – and not rule (1a). The observer will look at the
detectors at the beginning (event O) in order to verify the joint preparation
of the internal variables of D00. He will again look at the detectors at the
end (event P) in order to confirm the results of the measurement. If the ob-
server looks at detector at event A (or B) alone, the result will be indefinite. A
state reduction at one of these events would therefore destroy the superposition.
Definite results are observable only at the beginning and the end of the experi-
ment, and these preserve the superposition. Therefore, an observation and state
reduction will be allowed at events O and P, but nowhere else.
On the other hand, imagine what will happen if rule (1a) is in play, rather
than the reduction feature of rule (3). A state reduction will certainly occur
at events O and P, because a stochastic hit during the detector/detector in-
teraction will satisfy the requirements of rule (1a), as will a hit during the
physiological interaction with the observer. The question is: Will rule (1a) also
stochastically choose event A or B, thereby reducing the other component to
zero, and thereby demolishing the zero spin state?
Consider eventA. Rule (1a) reductions depend on a component of the super-
position being locally incoherent with other components in the superposition.
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So the question is: Are the D10 detector states appearing in each component in
eq. 8 locally incoherent; that is, are the environments associated with each of
these detector states orthogonal?
The internal variables of the detectors appearing in the two components are
correlated with one another, but they are separately indefinite. Their environ-
ments must not be allowed to interact with their respective internal variables,
for that would destroy this correlation. As a result, the environment associated
with one of the D10 states in eq. 8 is not measurably different than the envi-
ronment associated with the other. Consequently these environments are not
orthogonal, so the detector states in eq. 8 are not locally incoherent. Therefore,
the conditions for a rule (1a) reduction are not met. The same might be said of
the detectors emerging from event B.
It follows that even when rule (1a) has exclusive jurisdiction over reductions,
a reduction will not occur at events A or B. However, there will be a reduction
at events O and P because there will be a rule (1a) stochastic hit during the
detector/detector interaction in each case, if not during a subsequent physiolog-
ical interaction with the observer. Here again, the observer cannot know if his
final observation results from these reductions due to rule (1a) or to rule (3).
The superposition is preserved in either case.
In the previous section it was concluded that the distinction between an
observer measurement scenario and an objective measurement scenario is ex-
perimentally unverifiable. This now appears to be true in the present example
of initial coherence, as well as in all the other cases considered in this paper and
in the Appendix.
Nature of the Choice
We have a choice between the objective and the observer measurement scenar-
ios. This is not just a matter of temperament, for it is also a matter of judgment
as to what the future holds. There have been long suffering attempts to con-
struct a theory that supports the idea of objective state reduction. None have
been successful, and we have no reason to believe that there is such a theory.
Nonetheless, many remain convinced that measurement must mean something
independent of a conscious observer.
On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that there exists a theory
of conscious brain states, for conscious brains are clearly a functioning part of
Nature. There have been long suffering attempts in this direction too, but the
effort to understand consciousness and conscious brains is just beginning.
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It is my judgment that there is no general reduction theory independent of
an observer1. I believe that a proper theory of consciousness will one day be
found, and that it will provide the context in which the observer measurement
scenario will be vindicated. A theory of that kind is surely necessary to validate
the brains selection rules (rules 2 and 4), and to address the part of rule (3) that
changes a ready brain into a conscious brain. So either a future trans-Cartesian
theory will naturally include state reduction through rule (3), or a separate
theory will be found whose task is to validate rule (1a). I believe that the
former is more likely.
Appendix
In the following examples taken from previous papers, the empirical verifiabil-
ity of rule (1a) of the objective measurement scenario is compared with the
empirical verifiability of rule (3) of the observer measurement scenario.
An Intermediate Observer (ref. 1, eqs. 7-9)
A stochastic hit on the third or fourth component in eq. 7 could be just as
easily due to rule (1a) in the objective scenario, as to rule (3) in the observer
scenario. The same might be said of a follow-up hit on the third component
that leads to eq. 9. There might also be a rule (1a) hit on the second component
that results in a subsequent hit on the fourth component; but since the observer
cannot tell the difference between this and a direct hit on the fourth component,
rules (1a) and (3) are empirically indeterminate.
An Outside Terminal Observer (ref. 1, eq. 11)
The fourth component cannot be chosen in this case because that would be
an anomalous capture, inasmuch as rule (4) is in effect in either measurement
scenario. This means that only the third component in eq. 11 can be stochas-
tically chosen, and the observer cannot tell if the resulting reduction is due to
rule (1a) or rule (3). So again, the rules are empirically indeterminate.
An Intermediate Outside Observer (ref. 1, eqs. 12-15)
There are four potential stochastic hits in the section covering eqs. 12-15, In
every case, the resulting reduction might be due to either rule (1a) or rule (3).
1A footnote in ref. 5 makes an exception to this conclusion. I don’t think that superposi-
tions of black holes are possible because of the singularity at the center. Therefore, it is entirely
possible that the formation of a black hole automatically imposes a boundary condition on
the universe that is equivalent to an observerless state reduction.
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Therefore, rules are empirically indeterminate.
Drift Consciousness (ref. 1, eq. 16)
The stochastic hit on any one of the ready brain components in eq. 16
might be due to either rule (1a) or rule (3). The rules are therefore empirically
indeterminate.
Sequential Interactions with an Observer (ref. 2, eqs. 2-5)
There are three possible stochastic hits on the primed components in eq. 2,
each of which might be due to either rule (1a) or rule (3). There might also
be rule (1a) hits on either the second or third components that would result in
subsequent hits on the fifth or sixth components; and the observer could not
tell the difference between these and direct hits on components five or six. The
rules are therefore empirically indeterminate.
Version I of Schro¨dinger’s Cat (ref. 2, eq. 7)
The second component might be stochastically chosen by either rule (1a)
or rule (3). The rules are therefore empirically indeterminate.
Version I with Outside Observer (ref. 2, eq. 11)
Stochastic hits on the second and third components might be due to either
rule (1a) or to rule (3). All subsequent hits on these components will be on
components containing ready brain states, so they too might be due to either
rule (1a) or to rule (3). It follows that the rules are empirically indeterminate.
Version II of Schro¨dinger’s Cat (ref. 2, eq. 12)
A stochastic hit on the third component in eq. 12, might result from either
rule (1a) or rule (3). A rule (1a) stochastic hit on the second component would
result in an eventual hit on the third component, and the observer could not
tell the difference between this and a direct hit on the third component. The
rules are therefore empirically indeterminate.
Version II with Outside Observer (ref. 2, eqs. 15-16)
A hit on the fourth or fifth component of eq. 16 might be due to either rule
(1a) or rule (3). A primary plus a follow-up hit on the third component of eq. 16
will lead to eq. 15, and either one might be due to either rule (1a) or rule (3).
There might also be a rule (1a) stochastic hit on the second component in eq. 16
that would be subsequently followed by a hit on the third or fifth component,
but the observer could not tell the difference between this and a direct hit on
the third or fifth component. The rules are therefore empirically indeterminate.
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Version II with a Natural Wake-Up (ref. 2, eq. 19)
Direct stochastic hits on either of the components containing C or CN might
come from either rule (1a) or rule (3). There might be a rule (1a) hit on the third
component that would be subsequently followed by a hit on the fourth compo-
nent, but the observer could not tell the difference between this and a direct hit
on the fourth component. The rules are therefore empirically indeterminate.
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